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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JAMES IVERS; KATHERINE G.
HAVAS; and P and F FOOD SERVICES,
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Defendants/Appellants,
Court of Appeals Case No.

v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

20050246-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is proper in this case under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (West
2004). The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction under said provision, and has transferred
this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). The
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
PARTY IDENTIFICATION
The Appellants in this appeal are James Ivers, Katherine G. Havas, and P & F
Food Services. They are referred to herein as "Arby's." Appellee is the Utah Department
of Transportation and is referred to herein as "UDOT."
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Are severance damages available for Arby's diminished access to and from
U.S. 89, where the elevation and widening of U.S. 89 did not take place upon land taken
from Arby's, but within UDOT's existing right-of-way?

2. Are severance damages available where Arby's reasonable access to and from
U.S. 89 was preserved via access points to the north and south of the new frontage road
constructed on property taken from them?
3. Are severance damages available for Arby's alleged losses of view and
visibility, where the elevation and widening of U.S. 89 within UDOT's existing right-ofway caused the alleged loss, and not the frontage road constructed on the land taken from
Arby's?
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 (West 2004):
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as may be offered
by any of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and
assess:
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a
larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to
be condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned and the construction of the improvement in the manner
proposed by the plaintiff;
(3) if the property, though no part thereof is taken, will be damaged by the
construction of the proposed improvement, the amount of such damages;
(4) separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and
each estate or interest therein, will be benefitted, if at all, by the
construction of the improvement proposed by the plaintiff. If the benefit
shall be equal to the damages assessed under Subdivision (2) of this
section, the owner of the parcel shall be allowed no compensation except
the value of the portion taken; but if the benefit shall be less than the
damages so assessed, the
former shall be deducted from the latter, and the remainder shall be the
only damages allowed in addition to the value of the portion taken....
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

Nature of the Case
Arby's is a restaurant located in Farmington, Davis County, Utah at the northwest

corner of U.S. 89 and Shepard Lane. UDOT undertook a reconstruction project of U.S.
89 that was long overdue, and in the process of doing so took a portion of Arby's property
along the east side to construct a new frontage road. The frontage road was necessary to
preserve reasonable access to Arby's from U.S. 89 and from Arby's to U.S. 89, along
with reasonable access to all of the other businesses and residences in the area. U.S. 89
was elevated directly to the east and southeast of Arby's and widened, all within the
existing right-of-way already possessed by UDOT. No land taken from Arby's was used
to elevate or widen U.S. 89. It was only used to construct the frontage road that now runs
immediately to the east of Arby's.
In a ruling dated May 22, 2003, UDOT's Motion in Limine was granted with
regard to the issue of whether severance damages were available for Arby's diminished
access to and from U.S. 89 and its alleged loss of view and visibility. UDOT maintains
that the trial court's ruling that severance damages should be precluded from a jury trial is
correct and should be affirmed by this Court.1
B,

Course of Proceedings
UDOT filed a Motion in Limine and Arby's filed a Motion for Summary Judgment

on the issues of: (1) whether Arby's could seek severance damages for diminished access

1

A copy of the trial court's May 22, 2003 ruling is attached as Addendum A.
3

to and from U.S. 89; (2) whether Arby's could seek severance damages for alleged loss of
view and visibility; and (3) whether Arby's could seek damages for inability to comply
with local zoning ordinances, all of which were a result of the elevation and widening of
U.S. 89. The trial court concluded that Arby's could not seek severance damages for
diminished access or loss of view and visibility, but could seek damages for inability to
comply with local zoning ordinances.
The trial court certified its ruling under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure at Arby's request, and over the objections of UDOT, which prompted Arby's
to file an appeal. This court, upon a sua sponte motion, dismissed the appeal on the basis
that the trial court's order was ineligible for certification because the issues that would be
heard on appeal were not all of the issues remaining in the case. The parties then
undertook mediation to settle the zoning issue, which was successful. In said mediation
UDOT agreed to settle the zoning issue for the sum of $56,250, in addition to the $48,250
already paid for the actual taking. (R. 241). After mediation, the parties stipulated to a
final judgment, dated February 22, 2005, which allowed Arby's to pursue this appeal.
C.

Disposition of Trial Court
A final judgment was entered by the trial court on February 22, 2005.

D.

Statement of Facts
The trial court entered its May 22, 2003 ruling based upon the following

undisputed facts:
1. Arby's is located on the northwest corner of what was the intersection of

4

Shepard Lane and U.S. 89 in Farmington, Utah. (R. 72).
2. The size of the Arby's commercial site is approximately 0.416 acres. (R. 76).
3. UDOT condemned a 0.048 acre portion of Arby's property in fee. (R. 11).
4. The 0.048 acres of Arby's condemned property was used to construct a oneway frontage road immediately parallel to the newly elevated and widened U.S. 89. None
of the land taken from Arby's was used to widen U.S. 89. (R. 152)
5. The Shepard Lane/U.S. 89 intersection has been eliminated and U.S. 89 has
been elevated creating an underpass allowing traffic to travel east-west on Shepard Lane
underneath the elevated highway. (R. 151).
6. As a result of the project, access to Arby's from U.S. 89 can now be had from
access points approximately one-half mile to the north and one-half mile to the south of
Arby's to the new frontage roads constructed for the project. (R. 152).
7. Access to Arby's from Shepard Lane remains unchanged. (R. 152).
8. The purpose of eliminating the Shepard Lane/U.S. 89 intersection and thus
elevating and widening U.S. 89 was to decrease the number of accidents in the area due to
the nature of the intersection. (R. 152).
9. It should be noted that there are two other cases where properties adjacent to
Arby's and across U.S. 89 from Arby's have been denied the same relief in their
respective trial courts that Arby's is seeking in this case.2 Moreover, there is an appellate

2

Copies of both trial court rulings are attached as Addenda B and C.
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court case where the rulings in Harvey were upheld last year.3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Damages, if any, resulting from the closure of the Shepard Lane/U.S. 89
intersection and the elevation and widening of U.S. 89 are damages suffered generally by
all property owners in the area of the condemned property, are consequential damages and
are not compensable. All of Arby's neighbors have suffered the same diminished access.
Severance damages, which are compensable, are limited to damages to the remaining
property caused by a taking of a portion of the property or improvements constructed on
that property. The taking of a portion of Arby's property did not cause the closure of the
intersection, and reasonable access to and from U.S. 89 and Shepard Lane has been
preserved via the new frontage road. There is no "property right" in a particular route of
access or to a volume of daily traffic flow directly past the property; accordingly, no
damages are appropriate for loss of perfect access or a decrease in the flow of traffic past
Arby's from U.S. 89. Thus, evidence of consequential damages allegedly due to the
closure of the intersection, loss of perfect access, and a decrease in flow of daily traffic
past the property were properly excluded.
Moreover, claims for severance damages for losses of view and visibility are
limited to circumstances in which a structure violates some right appurtenant to the
abutting property or the structure inflicts some special and peculiar injury. Arby's is only

3

A copy of Intermountain Sports. Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 2004 UT App 405; 512
Utah Adv. Rep. 40; 2004 Utah App. Lexis 460 is attached as Addendum D.
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entitled to damages for loss of appurtenant rights if the structure causing the loss is
constructed on property taken from Arby's. The structure causing Arby's alleged loss of
view is the newly elevated U.S. 89, which was widened and elevated entirely within
UDOT's existing right-of-way. In addition, Arby's can obtain damages if the structure
causes a "special and peculiar injury" or, in this case, a special and peculiar loss of view.
However, unless the "special and peculiar injury" results from such an actual physical
taking, or the taking of some of the few appurtenant rights recognized in Utah, an award
of severance damages for such injuries would be contrary to Utah's eminent domain
statutes, which maintain that "special and peculiar" injuries or damages must be the result
of the severance of a piece of property or construction of improvements on the severed
property. The alleged damages claimed by Arby's are the result of the elevation and
widening of a U.S. highway within its own right-of-way, not from the property severed
from Arby's, which was used to construct the new frontage road.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DAMAGES CLAIMED TO RESULT FROM CLOSURE OF THE U.S.
89/SHEPARD LANE INTERSECTION NOT LOCATED ON ARBY'S
PROPERTY ARE NOT COMPENSABLE AND EVIDENCE OF SUCH
DAMAGES, IF ANY, WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED BY THE TRIAL
COURT.

A.

Arby's Claim to Severance Damages is Limited to Damages Caused by the
Taking of a Portion of Their Property or by Construction of an Improvement
on the Portion Taken.
Severance damages have been defined by the Utah Supreme Court as "those

caused by taking a portion of the parcel of property where the taking or the construction
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of the improvement on that part causes injury to that portion of the parcel not taken."
Utah Dep't of Transp. v. D'Ambrosio. 743 P.2d 1220, 1221 (Utah 1987) (emphasis in
original). The court also noted that "[t]he general rule is that damages attributable to the
taking of others' property and the construction of improvements thereon are not
compensable. Such damages suffered generally by all the property owners in the area are
deemed consequential. Id.; see State Road Comm'n v. Stranger, 21 Utah 2d 185, 442
P.2d 941 (Utah 1968). These rules were upheld and expanded upon by the Utah Supreme
Court's ruling in the seminal case on this issue and all other issues that remain in this
case, State of Utah v. Harvev Real Estate. 57 P.3d 1088 (Utah 2002).4 Harvey involved
the same expansion of U.S. 89 in Davis County, though the property is north of the area
in which Arby's is located. In Harvey, direct access from U.S. 89 to old U.S. 89 (also
known as the Old Mountain Road) was closed and substituted with a frontage road
system. The landowners in Harvey argued that they were entitled to present evidence of
alleged severance damages in trial due to loss of access to U.S. 89, along with a couple of
other issues that will be discussed in depth later in this brief. The basis of the
landowner's argument was Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 (1998), which gives landowners
the right to present evidence of damages caused by the construction improvements made
on a piece of severed property.
In its decision in Harvey, the Utah Supreme Court stated in reference to this

4

A copy of the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Harvey is attached as
Addendum E.
8

provision, "[i]t does not give the landowner the right to present evidence of damages
caused by other facets of the construction project. Were the opposite true, a landowner
would be entitled to present evidence unrelated to the taking." Id. at 1090. The Court
also noted that "evidence of damage caused by both the severance alone and construction
on the severed property may be presented." Id. at 1091. Ultimately, the Court concluded
that the landowners in Harvey had not shown that any damage they may have sustained by
the closure of the intersection had been caused by the severance of its land. Id. The
landowners in Harvey sought to establish a causal connection between severance damages
they claimed resulted from the U.S. 89 project as a whole and the taking of their property.
They did so by arguing that the closure of the Highway89/01d Mountain Road
intersection was made possible only by the taking of the Harveys' property. Id. The
Court concluded such was not the case because UDOT could have closed the Highway
89/Old Mountain Road intersection independent of the taking. Id. Furthermore, the
Court noted, "[t]he taking may be somewhat related to the closure, but it did not cause the
closure, nor did it cause the damages that Harvey claims as a result of the closure." Id.
In this case, the trial court concluded correctly when it stated,
[s]imilar to Harvey, where the devaluation of property arose from loss of
access to Highway 89, the loss of value Defendants claim will arise from loss
of access to Highway 89/Shepard Lane intersection is a result of loss of the
public's access to Arby's from Highway 89 and does not flow from either the
taking of 0.048 acres of the Defendants' property or from the nature of the
construction on that part of property.
Addendum A at 6.
Arby's has sought to distinguish this case from Harvey based upon the fact that
9

Arby's is a commercial entity located within a commercial area, whereas the Harveys'
property is located in a non-commercial area. The Supreme Court's decision in Harvey
made absolutely no distinction between commercial and non-commercial entities with
regard to whether severance damages were more or less appropriate for commercial as
opposed to non-commercial entities. In fact, in State v. Rozelle, 120 P.2d 276, 277 (Utah
1941), the Utah Supreme Court made no such distinction when it denied severance
damages to the owner of a gasoline station for loss of business.
Likewise, from a policy point of view, such a distinction is very problematic. If
this court chose to distinguish this case from Harvey based upon the differences between
commercial and non-commercial entities, implying essentially that commercial entities
are entitled to greater damages than non-commercial entities, then presumably each time
UDOT planned a project to widen a road or highway along which both commercial and
non-commercial properties would be affected, they would need to apply two different sets
of legal rules to the parties, one for the commercial properties and another for the noncommercial properties. Arby's is arguing that they should be treated differently than the
Harveys, in fact better than the Harveys merely because they happen to operate a
commercial venture upon their property. Such a result would be anathema to basic
constitutional principles that state the government should not treat a party differently than
a similarly situated party unless the government has a compelling reason for doing so, and
that result is narrowly tailored to meet that compelling interest, and no other interest.
E.g.. Grutterv. Bollinger. 539 U.S. 306, 326-27 (2003).

10

Such would not be the case in this situation. The government would have no
compelling reason for treating differently commercial and non-commercial entities that
are along the same highway, dealing with same construction project and the same
diminished access. If the value of the their property has been reduced by virtue of a
construction project undertaken on property taken from the property owner, then the
entities should be paid for the decreased value regardless of their status as either a
commercial or non-commercial entity. The reality is that in both this case and Harvey,
the impact upon the property was not a result of the property taken directly from the
landowners.
The trial court in this case further noted that the Defendants' claim that the
property taken from them was more integral to the reconstruction and, thus, the causal
connection between the taking and the damage to the property is more direct, was
misplaced. In Arby's appellate brief they refer to the property taken from them for
construction of the frontage road as being part and parcel of the elevation and widening
of U.S. 89. Br. of App. at 16. But, as the trial court recognized, "[defendants seem to
misconstrue the causal connection issue by focusing on the need for the taking rather than
focusing on the actual cause of the damage, which was the loss of access to their property.
. . . " Addendum A at 7.
Finally, with regard to the severance damages claim, the well-established common
law rule is that severance damages "may be made for any diminution in the value of [an
owner's condemned land], as long as these damages were directly caused by the taking

11

itself and by the condemnor's use of the land taken." 26 Am. Jur. 2d, Eminent Domain §
368 (1996) (emphasis added). Any severance damages alleged by Arby's resulted
indirectly because they resulted not from the land taken from them by UDOT, but from
the elevation and expansion of U.S. 89. Arby's thus cannot show severance damages
ensued directly from UDOT's taking because the taking was used to construct the
frontage road, which preserved their reasonable access, though it was diminished.
B.

Arby's is Not Entitled to Compensation for Loss of Perfect or Convenient
Access or for a Decrease in the Flow of Daily Traffic Past the Property.
The Utah Supreme Court held that "there can be no recovery from the State for

damages where the construction of the highway or the erection of structures within the
public right-of-way impair or adversely affect the convenience of access of an abutting
owner." Bailey Service and Supply Corp. v. State Road Comm'n, 533 P.2d 882, 883
(Utah 1975). In Harvey the Supreme Court noted that neighbors of the Harveys whose
property was not taken would suffer with the exact same diminished access to U.S. 89 by
the public to their business and would not be entitled to seek compensation because they
would not have had any property taken by UDOT. Harvey, 57 P.3d at 1091.
The public still has reasonable access to Arby's from Shepard Lane and from
access exits located approximately one-half mile to the north and one-half mile to the
south of Arby's. Moreover, in the recent settlement of the local zoning issues between
the two parties, UDOT agreed to help Arby's get signs put up at each access point to let
motorists know that if they want to eat at Arby's, they need to exit U.S. 89 at those points.
(R. 242). Those signs are now up and function to make people aware of the fact that if
12

they want to get a sandwich at Arby's, they need to exit because it is located just off of
the frontage road along U.S. 89.
Arby's access is all the more reasonable in light of the fact that Arby's never
enjoyed direct access to U.S. 89 in the first place. Their direct ingress and egress access
remains, as it was prior to the taking, on Shepard Lane. The property taken from Arby's
just prior to the U.S. 89 reconstruction project was actually used to construct only a
frontage road. The elevation and widening of U.S. 89 took place entirely within UDOT's
right-of-way along Highway 89. There is no dispute by UDOT that Arby's has
experienced less convenient access to its property, but they are not entitled to perfect
access. Any property owner is only entitled to reasonable access to and from his property,
in other words, to ingress and egress. Harvey, 57 P.3d at 1092. The access to Shepard
Lane is precisely the same as it was before the taking, and though direct access from U.S.
89 to Shepard Lane has been eliminated, vehicles can still reach Arby's from the new
frontage road via the two access points north and south of Arby's,
Appellants mention a traffic study they had done that allegedly demonstrates a
reduction in daily trip traffic to Arby's by approximately 40% after the elevation of U.S.
89 was completed. Br. of App. at 6. Inclusion of this information in Appellant's brief is
inappropriate and should be disregarded by this Court. This traffic study was not received
into evidence by the trial court, and UDOT was never asked by Arby's to make an
admission that this study should be admitted into evidence. UDOT has not had an
opportunity to cross-examine the engineering firm that did the study, nor has UDOT made
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a study of its own. Thus, because the study is not part of the facts entered into evidence,
it should not be considered as an issue by this Court as a part of this appeal. State by and
Through Road Comm'n v. Larkin. 495 P.2d 817, 820-21 (Utah 1972). Moreover,
attributing any or all alleged traffic reduction, and by implication depreciation of
commercial value, to the elevation of U.S. 89 is misplaced. Just prior to or at about the
time the U.S. 89 reconstruction project was undertaken, K-Mart, the anchor store in the
complex, went out of business leaving Arby's and its neighbor Goodyear without a major
commercial anchor. UDOT contends that the loss of an anchor store can severely impact
a fast food restaurant's business and could devalue the location commercially. Thus, to
attribute any loss of traffic flow or loss of business solely to diminished access from U.S.
89 to Shepard Lane is misleading. The reality is that we will never know which has had a
greater impact on Arby's - the diminished access or the loss of K-Mart to the complex.
Finally, as the trial court noted, the actual cause of any damage to Arby's was a
result of possible customers' diminished access from U.S. 89, which all of Arby's
neighbors have suffered equally. (R. 155). Arby's is only entitled to seek severance
damages for damages incurred from severed land taken by UDOT. Again, as the severed
land taken from Arby's was used to construct a frontage road, which preserved their
access to and from U.S. 89, and their customers' access to their establishment from U.S.
89, there is no question that Arby's has retained reasonable access. Apparently, Arby's
maintains that the only access that can be considered reasonable is the access they
enjoyed before the U.S. 89 construction. In reality, Arby's is seeking the exact same
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damages the Harveys were seeking, i.e., damages resulting from diminished access.
Utah's eminent domain statutes are only designed to compensate the landowner for
their loss of property rights. From a policy perspective, a landowner could conceivably
believe that there were several types of damages stemming from a road construction
project, some of which could occur several miles from the owner's actual property.
Permitting a landowner to present evidence of such distant damages could result in
verdicts that would prevent the state from ever undertaking any road projects. All of the
commercial property owners in the same area as Arby's have experienced the same less
convenient access to and from U.S. 89 in some form or another. Arby's is merely seeking
to collect money for that less convenient access, which the law does not permit, because a
portion of their property was taken to construct a frontage road.
C.

Arby's Claim to Severance Damages for Losses of View and Visibility is
Limited to Circumstances in Which a Structure Violates Some Right
Appurtenant to the Abutting Property or the Structure Inflicts Some Special
and Peculiar Injury.
1.

Arby's is Only Entitled to Damages for Loss of Appurtenant Rights if
the Structure Causing the Loss is Constructed on Property Taken
From Arby's,

The Utah Supreme Court held that in order to claim severance damages for loss of
air, light and view, an owner of property must show that "the structure violates some right
appurtenant to the abutting property or otherwise inflicts some special and peculiar
injury." Utah State Road Comm'n v. Miva. 526 P.2d 926, 928-29 (Utah 1974). Arby's
claims it has suffered a loss of view from its property, which UDOT readily
acknowledges is an appurtenant right to which Arby's is entitled. However, as the Utah
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Supreme Court makes clear in Harvey, "where an appurtenant right is severed from the
property, under section 78-34-10 damages may be awarded for the losses caused by the
severance of the right." Harvey, 57 P.3d at 1091.
Arby's has suffered a taking at UDOT's hands, and the improvement constructed
on that taking is a frontage road. Arby's has experienced no loss of view as a result of the
construction of the frontage road on the property severed from them. If they have
suffered a loss of view, it is the result of the elevation of U.S. 89, which was undertaken
entirely within UDOT's right-of-way. Appellants are correct when they state that Miya
makes no mention of the requirement that the structure be built upon property taken
before an abutting property owner could seek compensation for loss of view. However,
the reality is that Arby's and Miya are distinguishable because in Miya part of the
landowner's property was taken to construct the viaduct that resulted in the loss of view,
whereas in Arby's the loss of view is the result of the elevation of U.S. 89, which took
place on property not taken from Arby's.
Moreover, on the issues of compensation for loss of appurtenant rights and
"special and peculiar injury," Harvey clarifies what is unclear in Miya, holding that loss
of appurtenant rights is not compensable unless the public improvement structure causing
the loss of the appurtenant right is constructed on property taken from the landowner.
Harvey, 57 P.3d at 1091-92. This requirement is in line with the predominant view
throughout the country. "Although there is limited authority to the contrary, the
predominant view is that the loss of view from a landowner's property is not compensable
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unless the public improvement has been constructed on property taken from the
landowner by eminent domain." 45 Am. Jur, Proof of Facts 3d 519 §16 (2002). It is thus
readily apparent that Harvey embraces the predominant view, foreclosing Arby's from
presenting evidence of severance damages resulting from an alleged loss of view.
2.

Arby's is Only Entitled to Damage Compensation if They Can Show
that the Structure Inflicts Some "Special or Peculiar Injury/5

The trial court recognized the fact that Harvey clarified the "special and peculiar
injury" language in Miya as well. (R. 157-58). The trial court also noted, "[t]he court's
reasoning in Harvey that owners of neighboring properties to the condemnee, who would
not be entitled to compensation, would be similarly impacted by the closure of the
intersection is also relevant in considering the obstruction of view to Defendants'
property." Id. With regard to what Miya had to say about "special and peculiar injury,"
the Harvey court stated:
We have never explained what we meant in Miya by this language. To the
extent that it suggests that a landowner may recover severance damages
without either a physical taking or the taking of the few appurtenant rights
that this court has recognized, it appears inconsistent with section 78-3410 because, as noted above, this section requires that damages be caused
by the severance of the property or the construction of improvements on
the severed property.
Harvey, 57 P.3d at 1092. The Harvey decision went on to establish, "[u]nless the "special
and peculiar injury" results from such a taking, an award of severance damages for such
injuries would be contrary to the statute." Id. Thus, Harvey clarifies Miya by holding
that "special and peculiar" injuries or damages must be the result of the severance of the
property or construction of improvements on the severed property. Id.
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For the foregoing reasons, UDOT respectfully asks this Court to affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION
Both oral argument and a published opinion are appropriate in this matter due to
the weighty issues in dispute between the parties, all of which UDOT believes must be
affirmed by this Court.
Respectfully submitted this ' / day of June, 2005.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

IEN (2. WARD
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for UDOT
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Addendum 'A'

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,

vs

RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION IN LIMINE AND ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

JAMES IVERS, [CATHERINE G HAVAS,
P and F FOOD SERVICES (Tenant), and
ZIONS CREDIT CORPORATION,

Case No 020700665

Plaintiff,

Defendants

Judge Michael Ailphin

The above entitled matter having come before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion in Limine
and Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and the Court having reviewed the
Motions, and the Objections thereto, and the Replies thereto, and the Court being fully advised
in the premises enters the following findings of fact, and rules as follows

BACKGROUND

The matter before the Court concerns a taking of private property by the Utah Department
of Transportation to construct a new frontage road to U S Highway 89 near Farmmgton, Utah
Plaintiff filed a Complaint on December 20, 2002 Plaintiffs Motion in Limine was filed on
March 14, 2003 Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to the Plaintiffs Motion in Limine

and in Support of Defendants' Motion for Paitial Summary Judgment was filed on April I, 2003.
Defendants' Motion for Paitial Summary Judgment and Request for Oral Argument was also
filed on Apul I, 2003. Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment and Reply to the Defendants' Response to the Plaintiffs Motion in Limine was filed
on April 14, 2003. Defendants' Reply Memorandum in support of Defendants' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment was filed on May l t 2003 Notices to Submit for Decision and
Requests for Oral Argument were filed by Plaintiff and Defendants on May 7 and May 9
respectively.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Court finds the following facts relevant to the Court's Ruling:

1.

The Utah Department of Transportation (IJDOT) plans to eliminate the intersection of
Shepard Lane and Highway 89 by elevating Highway 89 over Shepard Lane to decrease
the number of accidents in the intersection..

2.

UDOT seeks to condemn 0 048 acres of Defendants' property in fee and a temporary
easement of 0 001 acres of Defendants' property.
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3.

The property is currently leased to P and F Food Services and is occupied by an Arby's
fast food restaurant. The lease will likely terminate as a result of the taking of
Defendants' land.

4.

The 0048 acres of condemned land will be used to construct a frontage road to U.S.
Highway 89 and will not be elevated itself

5.

Direct access to Defendants1 property from Highway 89 will be cut off as a result of the
construction. Access from the highway will then exist at points that are one-half mile
away from Defendants' property and will be circuitous. Access to Defendants1 property
from Shepard Lane will remain unchanged.

6.

A Farmington City ordinance requires a landscaped strip not less than 10 feet in width to
be maintained along property lines.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs Motion in Limine was to preclude evidence of severance damages or loss in
market value to the Defendants' remaining property caused by the taking of the land described
above and the highway reconstruction project. Defendants7 Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment was to secure an order allowing Defendants to present evidence of severance damages
caused by the reconstruction of Highway 89. In regards to takings, U.C.A. 78-34-10 provides in
part the following:
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as may be offered by any
of the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess: (2) if
the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the

damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason
of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the construction of
the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that Section 78-34-10 gives a landowner the right to present
evidence of damages caused by the severance alone or the construction of the improvement made
on the severed properly, but that it does not give the landowner the right to present evidence of
damages caused by other facets of the construction project. State v. Harvey Real Estate, 57 P.3d
1088, 1090 (Utah 2002).
The Defendants support their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and oppose
Plaintiffs Motion in Limine by arguing that (1) reasonable access to defendants' property will be
eliminated by the new construction, reducing the fair market value of the remaining property; (2)
the change in grade of U.S. Highway 89, which takes away Arby's eastern view and ability to be
viewed by potential customers, is compensable; (3) the inability to comply with city zoning
ordinances will also impact the fair market value of the property; (4) and the lease agreement
among the defendants may be terminated due to the impact of the condemnation. The Court
agrees with Plaintiff that termination of the lease agreement between the Defendants during these
proceedings does not bear on the issue of severance damages. The possible termination of the
lease does not, of itself, affect the fair market value of Defendants' property or the ability of the
property to produce rental income in the future. Defendants' other arguments are each discussed
below.
1. Loss of Value from Diminished Access
Defendants contend that reasonable access to defendants' property will be eliminated by
the new construction, thereby reducing the fair market value of the remaining property. Plaintiff
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(UDOT) properly relies on State v. Harvey Real Estate to support its position against
Defendants' argument. In that case, Harvey Real Estate owned approximately 160 acres of land
that abutted Highway 89, a major transportation route, on its western border. Similarly,
approximately 85 feet of the northern boundary of the property abutted Old Mountain Road,
which intersected with Highway 89 directly adjacent to the property's northwest corner. The
Harvey property had direct access to Old Mountain Road at its northwest comer along the
approximately 85 feet of frontage. From 1947 until 1999, the Harvey property also had access to
Highway 89 through a wide-gated agricultural entrance approximately 1,000 feet to the south of
the intersection. In 1999, UDOT closed the intersection and determined to build a frontage road
that completely separated the Harvey property from Highway 89, eliminating direct access to the
property from the highway by condemning a portion of the Harvey property. UDOT filed a
Motion in Limine to preclude Harvey from presenting evidence at trial that the closure of the
intersection would substantially decrease the value of the remaining property. The Utah
Supreme Court affirmed this Court's holding granting the motion because Harvey could not
show that "any damage sustained by the closure of the intersection [had] been caused by the
severanceof its land." State v. Harvey Real Estate, 57 P 3d 1088, 1091. The court pointed out
that Harvey was merely "seeking damages for devaluation of its property as a result of loss of
access" to Highway 89 and that owners of neighboring properties may be similarly impacted by
the closure of the intersection and would not be entitled to seek compensation. Id. at 1091.
Other cases decided by the Utah Supreme Court have addressed the causal connection between
the severance and the damage, see State v. Rozzelle, 120 P.2d 276, 277 (Utah 1941) (holding that
the loss must "flow from either the taking of the strip of condemnee's land or from the nature of
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the construction upon that strip"); Utah Dep't of Transp. v. D'Ambrosio. 743 P.2d 1220, 1222
(Utah 1987) (holding that "[sjeverance damages are those caused by the taking of a portion of the
parcel of property where the taking or the construction of the improvement on that part causes
injury to that portion of the property not taken"), and a landowner's right of access to his
property, see Hampton v. State, 445 P.2d 708, 710-711 (Utah 1968) (holding that the right of
reasonable access does not include "any right in and to existing public traffic on the highway, or
any right to have such traffic pass by one's abutting property").
Similar to Harvey, where the devaluation of property arose from loss of access to
Highway 89, the loss of value Defendants claim will arise from the reconstruction project on the
Highway89/Shepard Lane intersection is a result of loss of the public's access to Arby's from
Highway 89 and does not flow from either the taking of 0.048 acres of Defendants" property or
from the nature of the construction on that part of property. Neighbors around Arby's whose
property is not taken will suffer the same loss of access by the public to their businesses and will
not be entitled to seek compensation. The public still has available routes that provide
reasonable access to Arby's from Shepard Lane itself and also from exits from Highway 89
located one-half mile from Arby's. Because reasonable access to Arby's exists, Defendants
cannot say the damage to their property resulting from decreased traffic was caused by the
severance of their land and are therefore precluded from presenting evidence of devaluation of
their property resulting from the diminished access to their propertyDefendants seek to distinguish Harvey from the present matter on the grounds that
Defendants' property is used for commercial purposes and is located in a commercial area.
However, Defendants' cite no cases supporting the distinction between commercial property and
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other types of property. In fact, the court in State v. Rozzelle, 120 P.2d 276, 277 (Utah 1941)
made no distinction with commercial property when it denied severance damages to the owner of
a gasoline station for loss of business. Defendants also claim that (he property taken from them
is more integral to the reconstruction project and therefore the causal connection between the
taking and the damage to the property is more direct. But Defendants seem to misconstrue the
causal connection issue by focusing on the need for the taking rather than focusing on the actual
cause of the damage, which was the loss of access to their property as explained above.
2. Loss of View from Highway
Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides that "[pjrivate property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." Defendants allege that the change
in grade of U.S. Highway 89, which takes away Arby's eastern view and the ability of potential
customers to view Arby's property and signs, is compensable. When part of a parcel of land has
been acquired by eminent domain, some jurisdictions have allowed the jury to consider evidence
of reduced market value of the remaining land caused by an obstruction of view from the
owner's property while other jurisdictions have precluded it and denied compensation for
obstruction of view. See generally Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Eminent Domain:
Compensability of Loss of View from Owner's Property—State Cases, 25 A.L.R. 4th 671 (1981).
Those jurisdictions that have allowed compensation for obstruction of view have rested their
decision on the theory that owners of property own an easement of view from their property that
can only be taken with just compensation or on a showing that the fair market value of the
property has decreased as a result of the taking. See Utah State Rd. Comm'n v. Miya, 526 P.2d
926, 929 (Utah 1974); Bramson v. Berea, 293 NE2d 577 (Ohio 1971).
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In Miya, the Utah Supreme Court held that an easement of view is a property right that
cannot be taken without just compensation even if the obstruction of view is caused by a proper
highway use (some jurisdictions that recognize an easement of view nevertheless deny recovery
when the view is obstructed by a proper highway use, 2A Nichols on Eminent Domain §
6.11[2], 6-180 (3d ed. 1997)), Miya, 526 P.2d at 929. The court in Miya also hints that "special
and peculiar1' injuries, apart from recognized property rights, suffered by landowners may be
compensable, hi Plaintiff argues that Defendants' loss of view does not fit under the category
of "special and peculiar" injury and is therefore not compensable as severance damages.
However, the damage caused by the obstruction of view need not fit into the "special and
peculiar" category of Miya since an easement of view is a compensable, appurtenant property
right in and of itself See Id.
Miya is distinguishable, however, from the case at bar in that the loss of visibility in Miya
arose from an elevated highway built within the existing right-of-way on the land taken from the
condemnee. Because the loss of view in the case at bar arises from construction on property not
taken from Defendants, although some property was taken from Defendants, this Court's view is
that the loss in value to the property occasioned by the obstruction of view is not compensable.
"Where the loss of visibility results from an improvement of or on land that was not taken from
the claimant, such as on an abutting highway or on land taken from another, most courts have
found loss of visibility not compensable." Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Eminent Domain:
Compensability of Loss of Visibility of Owner's Property, 7 A.L.R. 5th 113 (1992); see also
People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Wasserman, 50 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1 st Dist. 1966) (recognizing
the settled rule of an easement of reasonable view, the court held that any impairment of the view
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of the landowner's property was not a compensable item of severance damages since the
improvement causing such loss of view was not located on the property taken from the
landowners); People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Becker, 69 Cal. Rptr. 110 (4th Dist. 1968)
(refusing to grant severance damages when the obstruction of view was not caused by the
improvement to the property taken); 8,960 Square Feet v State, DOT & Public Facilities, 806
P2d 843, 846 (1991 Alaska) (holding that "a property owner has no right to an unobstructed line
of vision to his property from anywhere off of his property, absent an easement of some sort");
Filler v. Minot, 281 NW2d 237 (ND 1979) (holding that although landowners were allowed
compensation for loss of right of view from their property, that principle did not extend to create
a compensable right to be viewed from the abutting highway). Furthermore, the Supreme Court
of Utah, in Harvey, held that Section 78-34-10 of Utah Code Annotated "gives a landowner the
right to present evidence of damages caused by the construction of the improvement made on the
severed property"

Harvey, 57 P.3d at 1090 (emphasis added). The court's reasoning in Harvey

that owners of neighboring properties to the condemnee, who would not be entitled to
compensation, would be similarly impacted by the closure of the intersection is also relevant in
considering the obstruction of view of Defendants1 property. Defendants' neighbors will suffer
the same loss of visibility to their own property as Defendants themselves. Because Defendants
do not allege a loss of visibility of their property from construction done on land taken from
them, they are precluded from introducing evidence of a decline in the market value of their
property caused by loss of visibility.
3. Devaluation Resulting from Zoning Requirements
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Defendants argue that the inability to comply with city zoning ordinances will also
impact the fair market value of their property. An existing zoning ordinance is generally held to
be a proper matter for consideration in a suit for the condemnation of property for the purpose of
determining the actual market value of land in measuring damages. See State by Rd. Comm'n v.
Jacobs, 397 P.2d 463 (Utah 1964); see also In re Old Riverhead Rd, CR 31 in Southhampton,
Suffolk County, N.Y., 264 N.Y.S-2d 162 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1965) (awarding severance damages
to a landowner in the amount required to bring the remaining land into conformance with zoning
laws, the violation of which resulted from the government's taking of a portion of his property);
People ex rel Dep't Pub. Works, v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 68 CaL Rptr. 663 (2d Dist.
1968) (holding that the total effect of the local zoning laws must be considered in arriving at the
appropriate measure of compensation in an eminent domain action).
Defendants allege that the taking of their property in this case will adversely impact the
fair market value of the property due to an ordinance of Farmington City that requires a ten-foot
green space around parking and service areas. Such diminution in value caused by the
necessitated reconstruction to bring the remaining property into conformance with the city
ordinance subsequent to the taking is properly classified as severance damages, and evidence
thereof should not be precluded in court.

RULING

Summary judgment is granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court
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must examine the evidence in "a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment."
Hunt v. Hunt, 785 P.2d 414, 415 (Utah 1990). Based on the foregoing analysis, Defendants'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted only to the extent that evidence of severance
damages resulting from any costs required to bring Defendants' property into conformance with
local city ordinances, the nonconformance of which are caused by the taking of Defendants'
property, will be properly admissible.
In accordance with the decision above on Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, Plaintiffs Motion in Limine is granted in part and denied in part. The Motion in
Limine is granted insofar that evidence tending to show a decline in the market value of
Defendants' property caused by the redirection of traffic over Shepard Lane and any resulting
loss in business ansing from the same shall be precluded. Similarly, evidence of loss of visibility
of Defendants' property caused by construction not on Defendants' property and that tends to
reduce its market value shall be precluded. Plaintiffs Motion in Limine is denied insofar that
evidence of severance damages arising from any costs required for conformance to city
ordinances after the taking has occurred that are caused by the taking is admissible.

Dated May 2X , 2003.
BY THE COURT:

' M C H A E L ALLPHfW
DISTRICT COUR-WUDGE
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OCT 0 5 200^1
SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Plaintiff,
RULING ON THE PLAINTIFFS
MOTION IN LIMINE

vs.
JAMES R. KIDDER, Trustee of the James r.
Kidder Trust; THE GOODYEAR TIRE &
RUBBER COMPANY (Lessee); and BURT
BROTHERS TIRE & SERVICE, INC.
(Lessee),

Case No. 020700664
Judge MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on the plaintiffs Motion in Limine that seeks to exclude
evidence of loss in value to the defendants' remaining property due to changes to the intersection
at Highway 89 and Shephard Lane. The Court reviewed the moving and responding papers and
for the reasons set forth below, grants the plaintiffs Motion. The defendants are barred from
presenting evidence of damages that are not directly caused by the taking of about .027 acres of
their property. Stated more plainly, evidence showing a decline in their property's market value

due only to loss of direct access from Highway 89, obstruction of the view from the highway, or
evidence of loss in business due solely to the change in the intersection is precluded

BACKGROUND
In December 2002, the plaintiff filed a complaint to condemn about 027 acres of the
defendants' property to construct a new frontage road There is a Goodyear Tire store on the
remaining property
The defendants* property lies on the northwest corner of the intersection of U S Highway
89 and Shephard Lane in Davis County Highway 89 runs approximately north-south, while
Shephard Lane runs east-west
Before the change to Highway 89, the intersection was at grade and cars traveling on the
highway could turn onto Shephard's Lane Additionally, before the improvements, cars headed
westbound on Shephard Lane could either turn right and enter the defendants' property or turn
left and enter the highway
After the improvements, Highway 89 and Shephard Lane will no longer intersect, the
highway will span over Shephard Lane and there will be no direct access to Shephard Lane from
Highway 89. Instead, Shephard Lane will remain at grade and pass under the highway.
After the improvement, highway traffic traveling southbound or northbound and wishing
to travel on Shephard Lane, will have to exit the highway V2 mile north or south of Shephard
Lane, respectively Shephard Lane traffic heading eastbound or westbound and wishing to travel
north or south on Highway 89, respectively, will need to travel on the frontage road for about lA
mile until it merges with the highway
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The only improvement made to the property taken by the plaintiff was construction of the
frontage road. The plaintiff used none of the defendants' condemned property to construct the
new Highway 89 overpass. The restructuring of the intersection in general will impair the
Highway 89 access and impair the view of all property owners in the area.
The parties dispute the evidence of severance damages that defendants may present.
Neither party disputes that the defendants may properly introduce evidence of loss in value to the
remaining property directly caused by the plaintiffs taking of .27 acres of land to construct the
frontage road. The defendants, however, argue that the restructuring of the Highway
89/Shephard Lane intersection diminished the value of their remaining property and that the loss
in value is compensable under Utah Code § 78-34-10. The plaintiff argues that § 78-34-10 bars
the evidence which the defendants seek to introduce, namely, evidence of diminished value to
their land caused by the construction of an improvement on land not theirs.
RULING
The underlying purpose of our eminent domain statutes, e.g. § 78-34-10, is to compensate
the property owner only for his loss of property rights-no more, no less. State v. Harvey Real
Estate, Ltd, Pship, 2002 UT 17, HI 10, 57 P.3d 1088. That section "does not give the landowner
the right to present evidence of damages caused by other facets of the construction project." Id.
Utah Code § 78-34-10 states:
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as may be offered by any of
the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess:
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel,
the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason
of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the construction of the
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff.
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Per section 78-34-10, condemnees may only present evidence of severance damages
directly related to the construction or improvement occurring on the severed property. The
Supreme Court in State v. Harvey Real Estate {"Harvey"), recently reaffirmed the meaning of
severance damages as "'those caused by the taking of a portion of the parcel of property where
the taking or construction of the improvement on that part causes injury to that portion of the
property not taken.*" Harveyt 2002 UT 17, at fl[ 11 (quoting Utah Dep't. ofTransp. v.
D'Ambrosio, 743 P-2d 1220, 1222 (Utah 1987)) (emphasis added). This statement comports with
other rulings affirming the same principle of law. See e.g. Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 752
P.2d 1321, 1325 (Utah 1988) (holding that the "erection of a permanent structure within a public
highway of such character as to rank as proper highway use, even if it diminishes the value of
abutting property, is not in and of itself a damage in the constitutional sense [and is not
compensable]/1); D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d at 1221 (holding that "[t]he general rule is that damages
attributable to the taking of others' property and the construction of improvements thereon are
not compensable"); State by Road Comm 'n. v. Rozelle, 120 P.2d 276, 276 (Utah 1941) (holding
that "loss of business to a filling station on condemnee's land due to change in highway could
not be considered in ascertaining value of condemnee's land after condemned strip had been
taken, since such loss did not flow from the [nature of construction on strip taken].")
Both the plaintiff and the defendants rely on the Harvey opinion to support their
positions. The defendants attempt to differentiate the Harvey opinion by noting several factual
distinctions between the defendants and the Harvey condemnees. In the Court's view,
defendants are splitting hairs in attempting to distinguish Harvey from the current matter, in the
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end, though the facts in Harvey might not be the same, Harvey's legal principles are still
applicable.
Regardless, the facts and arguments in Harvey, are in fact very similar to those in this
matter. In Harvey, there was a taking, it did involve improvements on land off condemnee's
property which limited access to the highway, and the condemnee was "'seeking damages for
devaluation of its property as a result of loss of access' to Highway 89." Harvey, 2002 UT 17 at
fl 12 (quoting appellant's briefs). The Harvey condemnee attempted to introduce expert
testimony showing that the closure of the intersection would substantially devalue its remaining
property because of the loss of access 1 . The Harvey court affirmed the trial court's ruling which
found that the Harvey defendant was not entitled to show damages caused by the closing of the
intersection as they were not damages caused directly by the taking.
The defendants' proposed evidence regarding property devaluation and obstruction of
view, considers those damages which are merely consequential-that is, suffered by all adjoining
property owners. The Harvey court reiterated that absent any special or peculiar damages,
"'there can be no recovery from the State for damages because the construction of a highway
may impair or adversely affect the convenience of access to property. 1 " Id. at ^ 14 (quoting Holt
v. Utah State Rd. Comm w, 51 i P.2d 1286, 1286 (Utah 1973)). Also, absent any special or

Our high court has also held that though property rights include the right of access, that right "does not
include the right to travel in any particular direction from one's property or upon any particular part of the public
highway right-of-way
Nor does the right of ingress or egress to or from one's property include any right in and
to existing public traffic on the highway, or any right to have such traffic pass by one's abutting property."
Hampton v. State, 445 R2d 70S, 710-11 (Utah 1968).
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peculiar damages to the defendants' appurtenant rights (right to light, air, view, etc.), those
consequential damages are not compensable under § 78-34-10. See id. at ^ftfl} 13-15.
It is not enough that the frontage road alone was constructed on condemned land; in order
for the defendants to show evidence of devaluation due to the actual construction of the overpass,
that improvement must have occurred either wholly or partly on condemned land owned by the
defendants. This did not occur and therefore the evidence the defendants seek to introduce must
be excluded.
Dated SeptemberJQ

, 2004.
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SMITH'S FOOD KING PROPERTIES,
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COMPANY; BOYER SHOPPING CENTER
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Case No. 030700021
Judge DARWIN C. HANSEN

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs Motion in Limine. Both parties decided to
forego oral argument on the matter and requested the Court enter a ruling based solely on the
pleadings. The Court reviewed the moving and responding papers and for the reasons set forth
below, grants plaintiffs Motion in Limine. Defendants are barred from presenting evidence of
damages that are not a result of the taking of a portion of defendants' property. Specifically,
evidence showing a decline in their property's market value caused only by improvements off the
property taken, i.e. changes to the intersection at Highway 89 and Shephard Lane, is precluded.

Ruling on Plaintiff's Motion in Limine

Defendants are also foreclosed from showing evidence demonstrating a loss in business
originating solely from the intersection's closure.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a Complaint January 2003 to acquire approximately 3/4 of an acre of
defendants' property to construct a new frontage road. There is a Smith's Food and Drug Store
located on the remaining property.
The Smith's property lies on the northeast corner of the intersection of US. Highway 89
and Shephard Lane in Davis County. Before plaintiff began making the current improvements to
the intersection, the intersection was at grade and cars could make left and right turns off
Highway 89 onto Shephard Lane and vrce versa. Additionally, cars traveling west on Shephard
Lane could turn right and immediately enter the parking lot of the Smith's property, and cars
heading eastbound could turn left into the parking lot.
After the improvements, Highway 89 and Shephard Lane will no longer intersect; the
highway will span Shephard Lane and there will be no direct access to Shephard Lane from
Highway 89. Instead, Shephard Lane will remain at grade and pass under the highway.
Southbound traffic on Highway 89 wishing to exit onto Shephard Lane will have to exit on a
frontage road about a half-mile north of Shephard Lane. Traffic traveling on Shephard Lane
wishing to travel Highway 89 in a southbound direction will have to access a frontage road
which will merge onto the highway some half-mile to the south. Northbound traffic traveling on
Highway 89 and wishing to exit onto Shephard Lane will have to exit onto a frontage road a halfmile south of Shephard Lane. Traffic on Shephard Lane wishing to travel on Highway 89 in a
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northbound direction will have to access the frontage road on the east and travel approximately a
half-mile before merging onto Highway 89.
The only improvement made to the property taken by plaintiff was construction of the
frontage road. Plaintiff used none of defendants' condemned property to construct the new
Highway 89 overpass. The restructuring of the intersection in general will impair the Highway
89 access of all property owners in the area.
RULING
This dispute concerns the amount of just compensation to be paid in this case,
specifically, what evidence of severance damages may be presented by defendants. Neither party
disputes that defendants may properly introduce evidence of loss in value to the remaining
property directly caused by plaintiffs taking of land to construct the frontage road. Defendants,
however, argue that the restructuring of the Highway 89/Shephard Lane intersection resulted in a
loss of value to their remaining property as a result of the change in access to the mtersection.
They argue that the loss in value due to change in access is compensable under section 78-34-10
and that they are entitled to present evidence of those severance damages. Plaintiff argues that
no taking or improvement related to the intersection closure occurred on defendants' condemned
land, and therefore any change in access is an indirect, consequential damage suffered by all
property owners in the area and non-compensable under section 78-34-10. In the Court's view,
what defendants seek to introduce here is evidence of damages caused by the construction of the
improvement on land that is not theirs-something repeatedly barred by our courts.
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Utah Code § 78-34-10 states in part:
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as may be offered by any of
the parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess:
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel,
the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason
of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the construction of the
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff
According to the plain language of section 78-34-10, condemnees may only present
evidence of severance damages directly related to the construction or improvement occurring on
the severed property. The Supreme Court in State v. Harvey Real Estate, Ltd. P 'ship, 2002 UT
17, 57 P.3d 1088, recently reaffirmed the definition of severance damages by stating, "'severance
damages are those caused by the taking of a portion of the parcel of property where the taking or
construction of the improvement on that part causes injury to that portion of the property not
taken."* Id. a t f l 11 (quoting Utah Dep't o/Transp. v. D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220, 1222 (Utah
1987)). This statement comports with other rulings affirming the same principle of law. See e.g.
Three D Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 752 P 2d 1321, 1325 (Utah 1988) (holding that the "erection of
a permanent structure within a public highway of such character as to rank as proper highway
use, even if it diminishes the value of abutting property, is not in and of itself a damage in the
constitutional sense [and is not compensable]."); D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d at 1221 (holding that
"[tjhe general rule is that damages attributable to the taking of others' property and the
construction of improvements thereon are not compensable"); State by Road Comm rn. v. Rozelle,
120 P.2d 276, 276 (Utah 1941) (holding that "loss of business to a filling station on condemnee's
land due to change in highway could not be considered in ascertaining value of condemnee's
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land after condemned strip had been taken, since such loss did not flow from the (nature of
construction on strip taken].")
When viewing the language of section 78-34-10 together with the clear statements of the
law in Harvey and other opinions dealing with severance damages, it is apparent that defendants
may not present evidence of loss in value to their remaining property due to the restructuring of
the Highway 89/Shephard Lane intersection.
Both plaintiff and defendants rely on the Harvey opinion to support their positions.
Defendants attempt to differentiate the Harvey opinion, however, by stating Harvey did not
involve a taking and did not involve impairment or alteration of the condemnees access to the
highway. 1 Defendants' reading of the matter, however, is incorrect. In Harvey, there clearly was
a taking, it did involve improvements on land off condemnee's property which limited access to
the highway, and the condemnee did complain that the limited access devalued his property. See
State v. Harvey Real Estate. Ltd. P'ship, 2002 UT 17 at TJffl 5-7. Indeed, the facts of Harvey are
almost identical to those in this case. In Harvey, the Utah Department of Transportation
("UDOT*') closed the Highway 89/Old Mountain Road intersection in Davis County, cutting off
access to the highway from Old Mountain Road

UDOT also condemned a portion of the Harvey

defendant's land to construct a frontage road along the highway. The Harvey defendant sought
to introduce expert testimony showing that the closure of the intersection would substantially
devalue its remaining property because of the loss of access. The Harvey court affirmed the trial

Defendants state: "Harvey Real Estate was simply another "no take" case because the public
improvement being constructed on the property did not impair or alter his access to Highway 89 since the Court
held he had no access in the "before" condition The severance damages sought tn Harvey Realty arose from a "notake" and were properly disallowed "
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court's ruling that the Harvey defendant was not entitled to show damages caused by the closing
of the intersection as they were not damages caused directly by the taking. 2
Like the condemnees in Harvey, defendants seek to introduce evidence of loss in value to
their property due to the change of the intersection. Whatever damages that might arise from that
change in access are what the Harvey. Three D, D 'Ambrosio, and Rozelle opinions consider
merely consequential damages, suffered by all adjoining property owners and not compensable
under 78-34-10. Although there was a taking of a portion of defendants' land, the improvement
they complain devalues their land did not occur on the condemned tract. The improvement they
complain of is the change to the intersection, which occurred on another's land. Even if plaintiff
had not taken defendants' land for the frontage road, it still could have closed the intersection
independently of the taking. As in Harvey, the taking of defendants' land for the frontage road
may be somewhat related to the intersection's alteration, but the taking itself did not cause the
intersection's alteration, nor did it directly cause the damages of which defendants complain, fn
order for defendants to show evidence of devaluation due to the intersection improvements, the
actual improvement or change in intersection must have occurred either wholly or partly on
condemned land owned by defendants. This did not occur and therefore the evidence defendants
seek to introduce must be excluded.
Defendants also put forth certain statements from the Three D opinion in support of their
argument. They cite to Three D for the proposition that '"substantial and matenal impairment of

2

Defendants argue that the result in Harvey, precluding evidence cf severance damages, was based in part
on the condemnees' loss of a right-of-way. This is an incorrect reading of the opinion Though the Harvey court
dealt with abandonment, that issue was really irrelevant to the severance damages issue.
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the plaintiffs right of access can constitute a compensable taking ,,f Three D Corp , 752 P 2d at
1324 (quoting Hampton v State Road Comm 'n , 445 P 2d 708, 712 (Utah 1968)) The Three D
court did state that rule of lawt but a full reading of the opinion will reveal that the Three D
opinion comports entirely with the cases previously mentioned The Thee D court, basing its
analysis partly on the opinion in Utah State Road Comm 'n v Miya, 526 P 2d 926, 929 (Utah
1974), noted that the Miya court clearly differentiated between "structures in the public nght of
way constructed under the exercise of state police powers which incidentally diminish property
values but do not impair property rights oi pose 'peculiar injury/ and those state actions which
substantially dimmish property value by impairing appurtenant property rights or causing
'peculiar injury

,M

The Three D and Miya court both held that there might be a taking in the

second situation, but that the first situation did not constitute a taking Three D7 752 P 2d at
1325, Miya, 526 P 2d at 929
Also, in attempting to harmonize precedents involving alleged loss of value due to
change in access, the Three D Court identified three general principles Three D, 752 P 2d at
1325-26 The second principle is applicable here Under that principle, there is governmental
action not involving a taking, but merely interfering with an owner's access to property, in that
case the Court stated the "the owner is not entitled to compensation so long as the owner still has
reasonable access

" Id (emphasis in original) The pnnciples stated m Three D comport

with the previously stated pnnciples found in other opinions and do not change the conclusion of
this Court
The Court's conclusion complies with the underlying purpose of 78 34-10 which is to
compensate the property owner only for his loss of property rights See State v Harvey Real
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Estate. Ltd. P'ship, 2002 UT 17 at %% 10 That section "does not give the landowner the nght to
present evidence of damages caused by other facets of the construction project" Id. Were that
so, the landowner could present evidence unrelated to the taking and defeat the purpose of the
eminent domain statutes. Id.
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BILLINGS

BILLINGS, Presiding Judge:
Pt Intermountain Sports, Inc. (Intermountain) appeals the trial court's grant of Utah Department of
Transportation's (UOOT) motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to rule 12(c) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. Intermountain argues that the trial court erred by granting UDOT's motion
because Intermountain has alleged facts sufficient for both its inverse condemnation and its uniform
operation of laws claims. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
P2 Intermountain owned and operated a recreational vehicle sales business located at 4225 South
500 West in Murray, Utah, near the 4500 South off-ramp from Interstate 15 (1-15). Intermountain's
business was accessible only from 500 West and not directly accessible from either 1-15 or 4500
South.
P3 From approximately July 1997 to May 2001, UDOT conducted a massive reconstruction of 1-15
(1-15 reconstruction). During the 1-15 reconstruction, UDOT periodically closed both the 4500 South
off-ramp and 4500 South to eastbound and westbound traffic. However, UDOT did not perform work
on 500 West, block or disrupt traffic on 500 West, or block direct access to Intermountain's business
premises on 500 West.
P4 Intermountain filed a complaint alleging six causes of action against UDOT, two of which are
relevant to this appeal. First, Intermountain alleged that the 1-15 reconstruction, and specifically, the
closure of the 4500 South off-ramp and 4500 South, blocked Intermountain's "easement of access" to
its business premises and that this constituted a "taking" under the Takings Clause of the Utah
Constitution. In particular, Intermountain asserted that by "taking" its "easement of access," UDOT (1)
© 2005 Matthew Bender & Company, inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. AH rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to
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"substantially and matenally impaired [Intermountain's] right of access to the 1-15 off-ramp at 4500
South and to 4500 South Street as well as (Intermountain's] customers' right of access to 4500 South
Street and [Intermountam]", (2) substantially diminished the value of Intermountain's property, and (3)
damaged Intermountain's private property interest for a public use without just compensation
P5 Second, Intermountam alleged that access from 1-15 to its property during the 1-15 reconstruction
involved a circuitous 2 5-mile loop making it difficult for potential customers driving on 1-15 to reach
Intermountam Intermountam claimed that UDOT constructed this circuitous loop so that other
businesses received the benefit of direct access to 4500 South off-ramp traffic and that UDOT refused
to offer Intermountam a similar benefit, which violated the Utah Constitution's Uniform Operation of
Laws provision
P6 UDOT filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure The trial court granted the motion ruling that Intermountam failed to state a claim for
either inverse condemnation or violation of uniform operation of laws Intermountam appeals
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
P7 Intermountam argues that the trial court erred by granting UDOT's motion for judgment on the
pleadings "When reviewing a grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, this court accepts the
factual allegations in the complaint as true, we then consider such allegations 'and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom m a light most favorable to the plaintiff"' Arndt v First Interstate Bank of
Utah, NA , 1999 UT 91 ,P2, 991 P 2d 584 (citation omitted) '"We affirm the grant of such motion only
if, as a matter of law, the plaintiff could not recover under the facts alleged '" Id (alteration in original)
(citation omitted)
ANALYSIS
1 Inverse Condemnation
P8 Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides, "Private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation " Utah Const art 1( § 22 "Under Utah law, 'the
takings analysis has two principal steps First, the claimant must demonstrate some protectable
interest in property If the claimant possesses a protectable property interest, the claimant must then
show that the interest has been taken or damaged by government action '" View Condo Owners
Ass'n v MSICO, LLC, 2004 UT App 104, P35, 90 P 3d 1042 (quoting Strawberry Bee Sen/ Dist v
Spanish Fork City, 918 P 2d 870, 877 (Utah 1996)) Thus, in order to state an inverse condemnation
claim, Intermountam must allege in its complaint a protectable property interest that has been taken or
damaged by UDOT
P9 Intermountain's complaint repeatedly characterizes its relevant property interest as an "easement
of access
to the 1-15 southbound off-ramp to 4500 South and to 4500 South Street" We agree
with the trial court that temporary denial of access to property does not constitute a taking See Rocky
Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc v Salt Lake City Corp , 784 P 2d 459, 465 (Utah 1989) ("The mere
interference with access to an owner's premises [is] not a 'damaging' or 'taking' withm the meaning of
article I, section 22 of Utah's constitution ")
P10 In both Intermountain's memorandum in opposition to UDOT's motion for judgment on the
pleadings and in its briefs on appeal, Intermountam asserts that its protectable property interest is the
right to use its land for a commercial enterprise 1 Regardless of how Intermountam characterizes its
complaint, what Intermountam is claiming is the right to a particular route of ingress and egress to and
from Intermountam and the right to have traffic flow in some particular pattern past its premises It is
well established that while property owners have a right of reasonable access to and from their
property, that right
does not include the right to travel in any particular direction from one's property or upon any
© 2005 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc, a member of the LexisNexis Group All rights reserved Use of this product is subject to
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particular part of the public highway right-of-way
Nor does the nght of ingress and egress to
or from one's property include any right in and to existing traffic on the highway, or any right to
have such traffic pass by one's abutting property
State v Harvey Real Estate, 2002 UT 107, P14, 57 P 3d 1088 (alteration in original) (quotations
and citations omitted), see also Utah State Road Comm'n v Miya, 526 P 2d 926, 928 (Utah 1974)
(holding that while the rights of access, light, and air are easements appurtenant to the land of an
abutting owner on a street, there is "no property right to a free and unrestricted flow of traffic past
[a property owner's] premises, and any impairment or interference with this flow does not entitle
the owner to compensation"), Hampton v State Road Comm'n, 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P 2d 708,
711 (1968) (holding that a property owner's right of ingress and egress to and from his property
and the abutting public highway does not "include any right in and to existing public traffic on the
highway, or any right to have such traffic pass by one's abutting property"), State Road Comm'n v
Rozzelle, 101 Utah 464, 120 P 2d 276, 277 (1941) (McDonough, J , concurring) ("Diminution in
value of the realty caused by the loss of the flow of traffic to or past defendant's place of business
is not compensable")
P11 While "the kinds of property subject to the {eminent domain] right
[are] practically unlimited,"
Farmers New World Life Ins Co v Bountiful City, 803 P 2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1990) (second, third,
and fourth alterations in original) (quotations and citation omitted), we are unwilling to adopt the view
that a business has a protectable property interest in the mere hope of future sales from passing
traffic or that the rerouting of traffic constitutes a compensable taking under article I, section 22 of the
Utah Constitution See Strawberry Bee Sen/ Dist v Spanish Fork City, 918 P 2d 870, 878 (Utah
1996) ("To create a protectable property interest, a contract must establish rights more substantial
than a unilateral expectation of continued privileges")
P12 Intermountain does not allege that UDOT performed reconstruction work on 500 West, blocked
or disrupted traffic on 500 West, or blocked direct access to its business from 500 West Because
Intermountain does not have a protectable property interest in an "easement of access" to 1-15 or
4500 South and because Intermountain was accessible from 500 West during the I-15
reconstruction, Intermountain has not stated an inverse condemnation claim Therefore, we hold that
Intermountain has failed to state a claim for inverse condemnation
II Uniform Operation of Laws
P13 Intermountain argues that the trial court erred by dismissing its denial of uniform operation of
laws claim UDOT argues that Intermountain's complaint fails because (1) the uniform operation of
laws clause is not a self-executing constitutional provision, and (2) even if the complaint properly
stated a claim, monetary damages are not available as a remedy under the framework set forth in
Spackman v Board of Education, 2000 UT 87, 16 P 3d 533 We hold that the uniform operation of
laws clause of the Utah Constitution is self-executing but that under the circumstances presented in
this case, monetary damages are not available
P14 Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides "All laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation " Utah Const art I, § 24 In Spackman, our supreme court provided guidance for
determining whether a particular constitutional clause is self-executing and whether monetary
damages are an available remedy for a violation of a self- executing constitutional provision See 2000
UT 87 at P1 The court explained that "a self-executing constitutional clause is one that can be
judicially enforced without implementing legislation " Id at P7
P15 The uniform operation of laws provision is self-executing because (1) it is presumptively
"mandatory and prohibitory" under article I, section 26 of the Utah Constitution and there is nothing in
the text that indicates otherwise, Utah Const art I, § 26 ("The provisions of this Constitution are
mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwiseM), see also
Spackman, 2000 UT 87 at PP11, 15 , (2) it has been judicially defined and enforced many times
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without implementing legislation, see Spackman, 2000 UT 87 at PP12, 16 , see also Ptnetree
Assocs v Ephraim City, 2003 UT 6, P17, 67 P 3d 462 , and (3) the histoncal context in which the
framers adopted the clause shows that they intended to constitutionals existing concepts, like equal
protection and due process, that did not require implementing legislation See Spackman, 2000 UT
87 at P13 , Malan v Lewis, 693 P 2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984) (holding that the uniform operation of laws
and equal protection clauses "embody the same general principle persons similarly situated should
be treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if their
circumstances were the same")
P16 The Utah Constitution does not provide monetary damages for violations of constitutional
provisions except for the takings clause See Spackman, 2000 UT 87 at P20 "To ensure that
damage actions are permitted only 'under appropriate circumstances/" our supreme court has held
"that a plaintiff must establish the following three elements before he or she may proceed with a
private suit for damages" for a constitutional violation Id at P22 (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 874A cmt d t at 303) Accordingly, Intermountain must have alleged facts sufficient to
establish the following three elements to survive UDOTs motion for judgment on the pleadings
P17 First, Intermountain must establish that it "suffered a 'flagrant' violation of (its] constitutional
nghts" Id at P23 (citation omitted) Thus, Intermountain must have alleged that UDOT "violated
'clearly established' constitutional rights 'of which a reasonable person would have known f " Id
(citations omitted) Intermountain stated in its complaint that UDOT violated article I, section 24 of the
Utah Constitution by
arbitrarily and capriciously providing other businesses with direct and beneficial access to 4500
South Street and by configuring such access so as to direct traffic flow to those businesses, south
of [Intermountain's property] and north and west of [Intermountain's property], while at the same
time refusing to offer such accommodations to [Intermountain] who paid substantial taxes to the
City and State and who relied on the City and UDOTs representations
It is questionable whether Intermountain alleged a "flagrant" violation of its constitutional rights
We need not decide, however, as Intermountain has failed to meet the other two elements
P18 Second, Intermountain "must establish that existing remedies (do] not redress (its] injuries"
Spackman, 2000 UT 87 at P24 This "requirement is meant to ensure that courts use their common
law remedial power cautiously and in favor of existing remedies" Id It is not at all clear from the
allegations in the complaint that existing remedies could not have redressed Intermountain's injuries
Under the transportation regulations of the Utah Administrative Code, Intermountain should have
exhausted its administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review See Utah Admin Code
R907-1-15 ("Persons must exhaust their administrative remedies in accordance with (the
Administrative Procedures Act ], prior to seeking judicial review"), Patterson v American Fork City,
2003 UT 7.P18, 67 P 3d 466 (holding that the plaintiffs' "bald assertion that the exhaustion
requirement does not apply to state constitutional claims is not persuasive")
P19 Utah Administrative Code R907-1-3 provides for the commencement of appeals of UDOT
actions by a member of the public See Utah Admin Code R907-1-3 Intermountain asserts in its
complaint that in reliance on statements from UDOT officials that its "concerns would be taken into
consideration," it did not "pursue action against UDOT
and has only now been able to determine
its ascertainable damages, making its claims ripe for adjudication " However, this does not provide a
legitimate reason to "relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or all
administrative remedies " Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-14(2)(b)(i), (u) (2003) (providing that a party may
seek judicial review instead of exhausting administrative remedies only when "(i) the administrative
remedies are inadequate, or (ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm
disproportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion") In addition, Intermountain is
not entitled to sit on its rights while it accrues damages when it had notice that other businesses
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allegedly received accommodations it did not, arguably in violation of the uniform operation of laws
provision
P20 Third, Intermountain has not established that "equitable relief, such as an injunction, was and is
wholly inadequate to protect [its] rights or redress [its] injuries" Spackman, 2000 UT 87 at P25
(emphasis added) Intermountain could have sought an injunction to enjoin UDOrs purported
discriminatory actions While the completion of the 1-15 reconstruction makes equitable relief pointless
today, Intermountain has not established that an injunction was wholly inadequate to protect its rights
or redress its injunes at the time of the 1-15 reconstruction See id at P24
P21 Accordingly, we hold that Intermountain may not proceed with a private suit for damages for
UDOT's alleged violation of article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution
CONCLUSION
P22 We hold that the trial court did not err by dismissing Intermountain's complaint Intermountain
has failed to state a claim for inverse condemnation and it cannot demonstrate that a private suit for
damages is available for UDOTs alleged violation of article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution
Accordingly, we affirm
Judith M Billings,
Presiding Judge
P23 WE CONCUR
James Z Davis, Judge
Pamela T Greenwood, Judge
Footnotes
Footnotes
1
Even if we were to accept Intermountain's characterization of its property interest, it does not help
Intermountain Intermountain's unilateral expectation of future business falls short of the types of
contractual property rights which our supreme court has described as protected See Bagford v
Ephraim City, 904 P 2d 1095, 1099 (Utah 1995) In Bagford, the court ruled that the plaintiffs' loss of
business from competition with Ephraim City's municipal garbage collection was not property within
the meaning of the Utah Constitution's Takings Clause See id The court stated,
to create a protectable property interest, a contract must establish rights more substantial in
nature than a mere unilateral expectation of continued rights or benefits
Thus, a contract that
is terminable at the will of either party does not by itself give rise to a protectable property interest
because the mere expectation of benefits under such a contract does not give the promisor a
legally enforceable right against a promisee to provide future service and therefore does not by
itself provide a basis for compensation for loss of future business
Id
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1QWE, Justice
INTRODUCTION
1 We granted a petition for interlocutory appeal filed by defendant Harvey Real Estate, a limited partnership, to
3View the trial court's determination that defendant was not entitled to introduce certain evidence in an eminent
omam proceeding We also granted a cross-petition filed by plaintiff Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT)
) review the trial courts ruling that UDOT had abandoned a perpetual right-of-way it had over part of the Harvey
roperty.

BACKGROUND
2 Harvey Real Estate owns approximately 160 acres of vacant land in Davis County, Utah Until 1999, the west
dge of the property abutted Highway 89, a major transportation route Approximately 85 feet of the north edge of
le property abuts Old Mountain Road The intersection of these two roads lies directly adjacent to the property's
Drthwest corner

T|3 Through the years. Highway 89 has undergone several expansions designed to compensate for increases in
traffic Several of these expansions have resulted in the condemnation of portions of the Harvey property by
UDOT or its predecessor, State Road Commission of Utah In 1936, pursuant to a condemnation proceeding,
Harvey's predecessor in title granted the State Road Commission a perpetual right-of-way over a section of the
property abutting Highway 89 (the right-of-way) The stated purpose of the right-of-way was to grant UOOT a
"perpetual Right-of-way for highway purposes," and for many years the land was used accordingly. In a 1947
condemnation action, the State Road Commission acquired fee title to most, but not all, of the land subject to the
1936 easement The State Road Commission later erected a fence a fixed distance from the centerline of the
highway separating the fee title property from the property that remained subject to the 1936 right-of-way. This
fence has remained in place, and UDOT has not used the strip of property still subject to the right-of-way since
about 1951 The strip has been used by Harvey and others for grazing and other private purposes.
1J4 The Harvey property has direct access to Old Mountain Road at the northwest corner of the property along
approximately 85 feet of frontage In 1947, Highway 89 was made a limited access highway where it bordered .he
Harvey property. Therefore, from that year until 1999, the property's only direct access to Highway 89 was
through a single wide, gated agricultural entrance approximately 1,000 feet to the south of the intersection.
t[5 In 1999, in order to decrease the number of accidents on Highway 89, UDOT closed the Highway 89/Old
Mountain Road intersection, thus cutting off access to Highway 89 from Old Mountain Road~UDOTatSCr^
determined to build a frontage road from the intersection to the Cherry Hill interchange, which is approximately .5
miles south of the intersection. The frontage road completely separates the Harvey property from Highway 89,
eliminating direct access to the property from the highway
j}6 Accordingly, this condemnation action was brought in 1999 by UDOT to acquire approximately 1.36 acres of
the Harvey property which UDOT needed to construct the frontage road from the intersection to the Cherry Hill
interchange. Believing that it still owned a nght-of-way over the remaining strip of the 1936 right-of-way, UDOT did
not seek to condemn it Harvey contested the existence of the right-of-way, arguing that the State had abandoned
it when the State separated the right-of-way from the highway by means of a fence After a hearing on the matter,
the trial court concluded as a matter of law that UDOT's predecessor, the State Road Commission, had
"abandoned all right to future use and all ownership in the Balance of the 1936 Right-Of-Way and discontinued
using that property for highway purposes" and that, consequently, Harvey owned the strip free of any right-of-way
held by UDOT
%7 Thereafter, UDOT filed a motion in limine seeking to preclude Harvey from presenting expert testimony at trial
that the closure of the Old Mountain Road/Highway 89 intersection will substantially decrease the value of the
remaining Harvey property. The trial court granted the motion. It concluded that evidence of alleged damages
from the intersection closure was not admissible because any damages sustained by Harvey were not the result
of the loss of land to be used in building the frontage road and thus did not qualify as severance damages. We
granted Harvey's interlocutory appeal and UDOT's cross-appeal
ANALYSIS
P Harvey contends that the trial court erred and contravened Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10 (1996) in not allowing it
to present evidence of the damages it will sustain from the closure of the Highway 89/Old Mountain Road
intersection. UDOT, in its cross-appeal, asserts that the trial court erred by ruling that the remaining strip of the
1936 right-of-way had been abandoned by UDOT and its predecessor. We address each issue in order.
I. SEVERANCE DAMAGES
A.
$9 Section 78-34-10 provides in part:
The court, jury or referee must hear such legal evidence as may be offered by any of the parties to
the proceedings, and thereupon must ascertain and assess:

(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel,
the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason
of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the construction of the
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff
The trial court ruled that under this section Harvey could not present evidence of any damage caused by the
closure of the Highway 89/Old Mountain Road intersection because the closure was not caused by the severance
of Harvey's property. Harvey argues against this result, contending that by limiting the evidence of severance
damages to "those harms flowing only from the actual taking itself," the trial court ignored the statutory language
allowing Harvey to present evidence of damages stemming from "the construction of the improvement in the
manner proposed " We disagree
HiO Section 78-34-10 gives a landowner the right to present evidence of damages caused by the construction of
the improvement maoe on the severed property. It does not give the landowner the right to present evidence of
damages caused by other facets of the construction project. Were the opposite true, a landowner would be
entitled to present evidence unrelated to the taking For example, where property was taken for a multi-milelength road construction project, a landowner would be entitled to present evidence of all damages conceivably
stemming from the road construction, even those damages attributable to construction occurring miles away. This
would defeat the purpose of our eminent domain statutes, which are designed to compensate the landowner only
for his loss of property rights Contrary to Harvey's argument, this interpretation does not render any part of
section 78-34-10 meaningless; evidence of damage caused by both the severance alone and construction on the
severed property may be presented.
1J11 We held essentially the same in Utah Department of Transportation v. D'Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220, 1222
(Utah 1987), although we did not reference section 78-34-10(2). There we stated that "[severance damages are
those caused by the taking of a portion of the parcel of property where the taking or the construction of the
improvement on that part causes injury to that portion of the property not taken/' (Emphasis added ) Our holding
today also accords with the well-established common law principle that severance damages "may be made for
any diminution in the value of [an owner's non-condemned land), as Jong as those damages were directly caused
by the taking itself and by the condemnor's use of the land taken." 26 Am Jur. 2d Eminent Domain § 368 (1996)
(emphasis added); see also 8A Nichols, Eminent Domain § 16.02(1] (3d ed 2002) (stating "severance damages
may be defined as damages or diminution in the value of the remainder resulting from the taking of a portion of a
tract of land" (emphasis added)) We have explicitly adopted this principle m Utah. See City of Hildale v. Cooke,
2001 UT 56, fl 3 & n 1 1 28 P.3d 697 (stating "severance damages may occur where a partial taking to a parcel of
land causes harm to the portion of the property not condemned" (emphasis added)); State by Rd. Comm'n v
Stanger, 21 Utah 2d 185, 186, 442 P 2d 941, 942 (1968) ("(Severance damages were those suffered by a
devaluation of the owner's property not taken, the causa causa causans of which was the actual taking of a part of
a unit of property, the whole of which he previously owned").
1J12 Harvey has not shown that any damage sustained by the closure of the intersection has been caused by the
severance of its land. Indeed, it recognizes that it is "[s]eeking damages for devaluation of its property as a result
of loss of access" to Highway 89 Harvey seeks to establish a causal connection between its alleged damages
and the taking by arguing that the closure of the Highway 89/Old Mountain Road intersection was made possible
only by the taking of Harvey's property, the inference being that the taking caused the closure. UDOT could have
chosen to close the intersection independently of the taking, however. The taking may be somewhat related to the
closure, but it did not cause the closure, nor did it cause the damages that Harvey claims as a result of the
closure. As the trial court correctly obsen/ed, owners of neighboring properties may be impacted by the closure of
the intersection but they, likewise, would not be entitled to seek compensation.
B
tJ13 Harvey attempts to avoid this result by relying on our opinion in Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, 526
P 2d 926, 928-29 (Utah 1974), where we held that rights of
access, light, and air are easements appurtenant to the land of an abutting owner on a street; they
constitute property rights forming part of the owner's estate. These substantial property rights . . .
may not be taken away or impaired without just compensation.

We stated that in order to recover for such a taking, an owner must show that "the structure violates some right
appurtenant to the abutting property or otherwise inflicts some special and peculiar injury " IcT As with other
takings, where an appurtenant right is severed from the property, under section 78-34-10 damages may be
awarded for the losses caused by the severance of the right
fl14 Harvey argues that it is entitled to relief under Miya because it is being "deprived of access " While we
recognized in Miya that the right of access is an appurtenant right, this right
"does not include the right to travel in any particular direction from one's property or upon any
particular part of the public highway right-of-way .. . . Nor does the right of ingress or egress to or
from one's property include any right in and to existing public traffic on the highway, or any right to
have such traffic pass by one's abutting property,"
Hampton v. State. 21 Utah 2d 342, 346-47, 445 P 2d 708, 710-11 (Utah 1968) (quoting State ex rel. State
Highway Comm'n v Meier. 388 S.W 2d 855, 857, 859, 860 (Mo 1965) The interest protected simply entails the
"right of ingress and egress to and from . . . property and the abutting public highway" \± at 711 Harvey's
property may be accessed through both the new frontage road and Old Mountain Road; consequently, its right of
access has not been denied The right does not extend so far as to guarantee a property owner that his property
wilL.be accessed through specific intersections or that the roads accessing his property will be easily accessed
from other thoroughfares See, e.g., Holt v. Utah State Rd. Comm'n, 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P 2d 1286, 1286 (1973)
(stating "the law has fong been established in this State that under those circumstances there can be no recovery
from the State for damages because the construction of a highway may impair or adversely affect the
convenience of access to property"), overruled in part on other grounds by Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795
P.2d 622, 632 (Utah 1990)). Thus, UDOT has not "taken" Harvey's right of access, and Harvey is not entitled to
recover severance damages on that theory.
TJ15 Harvey also contends that under Miya he is entitled to severance damages because he has suffered a
"special and peculiar injury " We have never explained what we meant in Miya by this language. To the extent
that it suggests that a landowner may recover severance damages without either a physical taking or the taking of
the few appurtenant rights that this court has recognized, it appears inconsistent with section 78-34-10 because,
as noted above, this section requires that damages be caused by the severance of the property or the
construction of improvements on the severed property § 78-34-10. Unless the "special and peculiar injury" results
from such a taking, an award of severance damages for such injuries would be contrary tc the statute. As a
practical matter, where a taking has occurred an owner would not need to rely on the "special and peculiar injury"
he has suffered because he could recover directly for the taking itself Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
refusing to allow Harvey to prove section 78-34-10 damages on this ground
II. ABANDONMENT
1J16 UDOT contends that the trial court erred in determining that it had abandoned its right-of-way over the
remaining strip subject to the 1936 condemnation when it constructed a fence separating the strip from the
highway. It asserts that our statutes have consistently required that portions of a highway may be abandoned only
by affirmative formal action by a public authority with authority to do so. We agree.
1J17 Section 36-1-3 of Utah Code Ann. (1943) provided: "All highways once established must continue to be
highways until abandoned by order of the board of county commissioners of the county in which they are situated
or other competent authority." This statute has remained essentially unchanged since 1951, the year the
remaining strip was fenced off. See Utah Code Ann, § 72-5-105 (1999) (stating "[ajli public highways once
established shall continue to be highways until abandoned or vacated by order of the highway authorities having
jurisdiction . .."). These statutes unambiguously establish that all public highways remain as such unless they are
officially abandoned or vacated by order of the proper authority. They make no allowance for any other type of
abandonment or vacation. Western Kane County Special Serv. DisL No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376
(Utah 1987),
1118 In the instant case, once the land was dedicated to highway use by way of the 1936 right-of-way, it could not
be abandoned or revert back to its owners without an official order of a competent authority. Harvey has failed to
establish that such an order was made. Consequently, the trial court erred m ruling that UDOT had abandoned its

nght-of-way
^f 19 Harvey endeavors to avoid this outcome by urging us to apply common law rules concerning the
abandonment of easements This we cannot do Our statute controls and makes no distinction between highways
where the public holds fee title or only a right-of-way as here To the extent that it is inconsistent with common law
property pnnciples, it preempts them
CONCLUSION
JJ20 The trial court correctly ruled that Harvey was not entitled to prove damages caused by the closing of the
intersection The trial court erred by ruling that UDOT had abandoned its nght-of-way over the remaining strip of
the 1936 condemnation
fl21 Affirmed in part, reversed in part

fl22 Chief Justice Durham, Associate Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Russon, and Justice Wilkins concur in Justice
Howe's opinion

